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Abstract
Studies of experimental and betting markets have shown that markets are able to
efficiently aggregate information dispersed over many traders. We study information
aggregation in Arrow-Debreu markets using a novel information structure. Compared
to previous studies, the information structure is more complex, allows for heterogeneity
in information among traders – which provides insights into the way in which infor-
mation is gradually disseminated in the market – and generates situations in which
all traders hold identical beliefs over the traded assets’ values, thus providing a harsh
stress test for belief updating. We find little evidence for information aggregation and
dissemination in early rounds. Nonetheless, after traders gain experience with the
market mechanism and structure, prices converge to reveal the true state of the world.
Elicited post-market beliefs reveal that markets are able to efficiently aggregate dis-
persed information even if individual traders remain uninformed, consistent with the
marginal trader hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
The idea that markets can aggregate dispersed private information into prices is central to
much of economic thinking.1 When some traders are fully informed about the true state
of the world, competitive bidding will push prices to reflect the true state, thus revealing
the information to uninformed traders. A more challenging case is when each trader only
holds partial information about the true state. If traders understand how the different pieces
of information affect behaviour, the movement of prices eventually reveals the information
held by other traders. Furthermore, if traders continuously condition their market demands
on their own information, then market prices should continuously move until no trader can
learn any more from the prices.2 Naturally, whether equilibrium market prices fully reveal the
true state depends on the information structure. Radner (1979) showed that prices converge
to an equilibrium as if each trader openly and truthfully communicates his own private
information. This result, however, requires that traders hold diverse or heterogeneous partial
private information and that the true state is in the unique element within the intersect of
at least two different private information.3 This analysis equates the states of the world with
beliefs over the traded assets’ possible valuations. It remains an open question, therefore,
whether market prices are able to fully reveal the true state even when traders hold identical
or homogeneous partial private information, in the sense that it induces the same beliefs over
asset valuations. This paper studies the information aggregation properties of markets in
a novel design that allows us to clearly distinguish between situations where traders hold
homogeneous and heterogeneous partial private information about the true state of the world.
Empirical studies suggest that the intricate process of information aggregation (e.g.,
learning about the information of others through price movements) postulated by theory
often places too many demands on the abilities of the traders (see De-Bondt and Thaler,
1985; Thaler, 1988; Hirshleifer, 2001; Shleifer, 2000). However, identifying ‘who knows what’
1 The idea often builds upon the early discussions by Hayek (1945) and was subsequently development
further by Grossman (1976). It is also the central theme of the “efficient market hypothesis” (Fama, 1970).
2Alternatively, some traders could seek to learn more about the true event at a cost. However, Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) challenged the notion that traders will be willing to incur such costs if market prices will
eventual reveal what they learnt.
3 For example, consider the state space f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g, where the true state is 4. Suppose that trader A
knows that the true state is in f1; 2; 3; 4g and trader B knows that the true state is in f4; 5; 6g. Combining
both pieces of information through open communication, both traders will realise that the true state must
be 4. Conversely, if trader B’s partition is such that she knows the true state to be in f3; 4; 5g, then the
combined information can only reveal that the true state is either 3 or 4.
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is often challenging in empirical market research. Controlled experimental environments
complete the picture by studying market behaviour in a highly structured environment,
where the experiment designer controls the information structure. Laboratory experiments
study the general principles underpinning economic behavior with extraordinary control over
independent variables, and generally generalise well to various field environments (Camerer,
2015). Market experiments, in particular, yield similar results with student and businessmen
populations (e.g., Porter and Smith, 1994).
In a study of information dissemination in experimental single-period markets, Plott and
Sunder (1982) found that asset prices converge to fully reveal the true state even when only a
subset of the traders had full information about the true state.4 Markets where traders have
partial information pose a greater challenge to successful convergence, as market prices have
a double role of information aggregation and dissemination (e.g., Plott and Sunder, 1988;
Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990; Copeland and Friedman, 1987; Camerer and Weigelt, 1991;
O’Brien and Srivastava, 1991).5 Plott and Sunder (1988) pioneered the laboratory study of
information aggregation in single-period markets structured as event-contingent assets. In
their experiments, the true state of the world can either be X, Y or Z with some known
probabilities. For each state other than the true state, half of the traders are informed of
the false state. For example, let the true state be Y . In this case, half of the traders know
the true state to be either X or Y (i.e., not Z), and the other traders know the true state
to be either Y or Z (i.e., not X). Thus, traders have heterogeneous information that, if
aggregated efficiently, is enough to fully reveal the true state. In the treatments closest to
our design, the market consists of three types of assets x, y and z, which pay a positive
dividend for the states X, Y , and Z, respectively (e.g., asset x pays a positive dividend
if and only if the true state is X).6 The results of Plott and Sunder (1988) show that
market prices converge to the true value of the asset – thereby revealing the true state –
even when there is no immediate incentive for any trader to reveal their private information.
However, the information structure used in the experiments greatly facilitates information
dissemination and aggregation. For example, if the true event is Y , then the distribution
4 Developments in uses of predictions markets (e.g., Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Chen and Plott, 2002)
are often inspired by the success of markets in this respect.
5 For a broader summary of market experiments on information aggregation, see surveys by Sunder
(1995); Duxbury (1995); Noussair and Tucker (2013).
6 Subsequent studies have used a similar design to study price manipulation (e.g., Hanson et al., 2006;
Veiga and Vorsatz, 2010) and the interplay between trading performances and overconfidence (Biais et al.,
2005).
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of private information implies that demand for asset y will easily outstrip those for assets
x and z.7 As such, the market demand for asset y relative to those of assets x and z will
immediately reveal the true event to be Y:
In this paper, we study a more complex and asymmetric information structure. This
structure allows us to test an environment where information aggregation requires counter-
factual reasoning, and to test gradual aggregation and dissemination of information. The
information structure we employ differs from that of Plott and Sunder (1988) in two impor-
tant ways. First, it relaxes the one-to-one relation of states of the world to profitable assets
(Arrow-Debreu securities) by allowing different states to map onto the same asset. Second,
while the states of the world are symmetric and equiprobable, the different possible asset
evaluations are not. This asymmetry in information translates to asymmetry with regards
to the information held by different types of traders.
These two design innovations raise two new issues, respectively. First, as different states
of the world map to the same asset value, we generate a situation where, in some states,
all of the traders hold exactly the same beliefs over the assets’ values despite having diverse
information regarding the underlying state of the world. In previous studies, such as Plott
and Sunder (1988), traders always potentially observe some market activity (asks, bids, or
transactions) that is inconsistent with some state of the world that they consider possible.
Such market activity reveals that there exist other traders who hold different information,
and thus conveys new information about the true state. In our setting, in contrast, the
different information held by different traders translates to the same beliefs and the same
market activity, hence the observed market activity does not provide any new information
regarding the true state. The diverse information held by different traders, if aggregated
successfully, is nonetheless sufficient to fully reveal the true state. To do so requires counter-
factual reasoning: traders should realize that all observed market activity is consistent with
their own beliefs about the assets’ values, and consequently eliminate the states of the world
in which some of the other traders hold differing beliefs. Our experiment tests whether this
feature of the market impedes, or even prevents, successful aggregation of information.
Second, in states of the world where different traders do hold different beliefs, we can
identify a minority of traders who hold different beliefs to those held by the majority traders.
Since the majority traders dominate the market and the price setting, the minority traders
stand to better learn new information from the initial movement of prices. Accordingly, we
7 The not X traders will have positive demands for assets z and y, whilst the not Z traders will have
positive demands for assets x and y.
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test whether these minority traders become better informed about the true state of the world
and about the true value of the assets, and whether they can leverage this knowledge for
profit.8
Finally, previous studies have focused on aggregate outcomes in the market. Our exper-
imental design introduces yet another new feature. To test individual belief updating and
information dissemination, we elicit traders’ post-market beliefs about the true asset-relevant
event. This allows us to test whether individual revelation of the true state is a necessary
condition for information revelation in market prices.
We present a simple fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium (FRE) model, which
shows that information aggregation and full revelation of the true state is possible in our
setup both when traders’ beliefs over the assets’ values are heterogeneous and homogeneous.
Furthermore, when traders hold heterogeneous private information, the model predicts that
a minority subset of traders (the minority traders) will learn about the true state before the
others and will be instrumental in driving prices towards the FRE. Against this backdrop,
three questions are investigated:
RQ1: Can Arrow-Debreu markets be successful at aggregating private information about the
true event into prices, even when traders are endowed with homogeneous beliefs, such
that information aggregation is challenging and requires traders to employ sophisti-
cated counterfactual reasoning?
RQ2: Are minority traders better informed about the true event, can they leverage this
knowledge for profit, and are they instrumental in driving prices to reveal the true
state?
RQ3: Can individuals in the market learn the true event from the movement of prices, and
is individual learning a necessary condition for information aggregation in the prices?
To measure success at information aggregation in the experimental setting, we benchmark
the FRE model against a prior-information equilibrium (PIE) model.9 The PIE model
8 Plott and Sunder (1988) included several treatments where a single asset was traded, which valuations
depend on the state of the world. This induces some asymmetries, not in the information structure as in
the present study, but in the asset valuations. As (with a limited supply of the asset) the price reveals the
highest valuation in the market, traders who hold lower valuations are potentially better informed. Plott
and Sunder (1988) did not explore the implications of such differences between trader types in their data.
9 This builds on prior experimental research on the issue of information aggregation (e.g., Banks, 1985;
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assumes that the traders update their beliefs given their private information, but fail to
take market activity into account. Thus, we test the ability of the market to aggregate
dispersed information by comparing the observed final market prices to the FRE and PIE
predictions. The post-market beliefs allow us to test the role of individual beliefs in market
prices convergence to the true values and the dissemination of information throughout the
market. By repeating the market game, we are able to test the role of market experience in
information aggregation and dissemination.10
Our findings can be summarised as follows. Markets are successful at aggregating dis-
persed information in the prices when traders are experienced, but not in early rounds.
Although market prices reflect the true state, traders largely remain ignorant in the post-
market stage. This finding is consistent with the marginal trader hypothesis (e.g., Forsythe
et al., 1992), which posits that efficiency in market prices only require a small population
of sophisticated traders, who are influential in driving prices to the competitive equilibrium.
We observe successful price convergence even in the more challenging case of homogeneous
beliefs. That is, we do not find any significant differences in the information aggregation
properties of markets when traders are endowed with homogeneous or heterogeneous private
information. Finally, we find some evidence suggesting that minority traders learn about the
true event before others and are instrumental in driving prices towards the FRE. There is
no evidence, however, that the better-informed minority traders are able to extract a higher
share of the surplus.
2 Experimental Design
We conducted 7 experimental sessions involving 12 subjects each. Participants were recruited
from the subject pool of the experimental economics laboratory at Ben-Gurion University
of the Negev using the recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). All sessions were
programmed with the z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) software. Subjects in each session were first
given 45 minutes to familiarise themselves with the instructions, complete an accompanying
set of control questions and participate in two non-paying practice rounds (see the appendix
for the translated instructions). The experiment itself included 10 rounds. All payoffs were
Barner et al., 2005; Camerer and Weigelt, 1991; Copeland and Friedman, 1987; Forsythe and Lundholm,
1990; O’Brien and Srivastava, 1991; Plott and Sunder, 1982, 1988).
10 Plott (2000) found that prices converge fairly efficiently to the FRE when subjects have some experience
(i.e., after three rounds or more).
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stated in ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), and converted to New Israeli Shekels (NIS)
at the end of the experiment at a conversion rate of 15 ECU = 1 NIS. The final payoff
consisted of the payoff of one randomly chosen round in addition to a show-up fee of 25
NIS. The average payment including show-up fee was 73.33 NIS (approximately 21 USD).
Average session duration was approximately 120 minutes.
2.1 Market structure and procedure
The twelve traders are randomly allocated into three groups of four traders each. Each
group k 2 f1; 2; 3g is randomly assigned to be of type X or type O with equal probabilities.
Thus, there are eight equally probable states of the world s 2 S  kHk, where Hk 2 fX;Og
denotes group k’s type.11 Let the event x(s) 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g denote the total number of type X
groups at state s (e.g., x(s) = 1 iff s 2 fXOO;OXO;OOXg). At each state s 2 S, traders
observe the type of the two other groups, but not their own group’s type. For example,
in the case where s = XXO, the first two groups observe one X and one O, hence only
events 1 and 2 are possible. The third group observes two X’s, hence only events 2 and 3
are possible.
For the true state s 2 S, we define the event x(s) as the corresponding true event. This
distinction is necessary as market prices will convey information about the true event rather
than the true state. The information structure is commonly known and endows traders with
private and partial information over the true event. For example, if s = XXX, then all
traders will observe two other type X groups, implying that they each know the true event
x(s) to be either 2 or 3.
Trade involves four “types” of Arrow-Debreu assets, indexed by  2 f0; 1; 2; 3g. The
value of asset  given the true event x(s) is given by
d(x(s); ) =
(
100 if  = x(s);
0 otherwise:
Each trader is endowed with a working capital loan of 5,000 ECU and six units of each of
the four assets. There are four simultaneous markets, one for each asset. Trade is conducted
using the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism for a duration of 300 seconds. Short
sales are prohibited, and a price ceiling of 200 ECU is imposed on the bid and ask prices to
11 The eight states are XXX, OXX, XOX, XXO, XOO, OXO, OOX and OOO, where the first, second
and third coordinates of each state denote the type of groups 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
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limit potential negative profits. Note that traders at the start of the markets do not know
the value of each asset (i.e., they don’t know which assets are valued at 0 or 100). Instead,
they only know that the value of each asset can be either 100 or 0, depending on the true
event x(s).
After 300 seconds, the CDA market closes and traders enter the post-market stage. Here,
traders are asked to guess how many type X groups were in the market. The response
bi 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g is taken to be participant i’s elicited belief.12 The payment for beliefs is
given by
g(x(s); bi) =
(
200 if bi = x(s);
 200 otherwise:
At the end of the round, traders receive feedback on the true state, the unit value and
number of units owned for each of the four assets, and their detailed final round payoff. The
round payoff consist of the total value of owned assets and remaining capital, minus the
initial loan of 5,000 ECU, plus payment for the submitted beliefs.13 Denote by Li  0 and
ei  0 trader i’s inventory of capital and asset , respectively. Thus, each trader i’s payoff
is given by:
i = (Li   5; 000) +
3X
=0
d(x(s); i)ei| {z }
market payoff
+
post-market payoffz }| {
g(x(s); bi);
where the first term captures the consequences of the trader’s market decisions and the
second his submitted beliefs.
12 Eliciting a (modal) point belief is sufficient for the purpose of assessing individuals’ ability to learn
the true state from the observed market prices. The alternative of eliciting a full belief distribution would
require an incentive compatible scoring rule, which is likely to be confusing for experimental subjects.
13 Because the loan of 5,000 ECU is to be returned at the end of the round, there were some instances
of bankruptcy (13% of all observations). In the first five rounds, these appeared to be distributed rather
uniformly across all subjects. In the last five rounds, bankruptcies were concentrated in a handful of subjects,
suggesting that the initial bankruptcies were part of the learning process. See the appendix for more details.
Note that the limited liability doesn’t impact the theoretical analysis, as it doesn’t bias trading decisions
with respect to the true asset, but may impede information aggregation by increasing risky and/or noisy
investments. Thus, if anything, we are underestimating the market’s true ability to aggregate information
without limited liability.
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3 Theoretical analysis
3.1 Preliminaries
We shall refer to the events x(s) 2 f1; 2g as the heterogeneous events, given that they induce
different beliefs in different traders. That is, the private information held by traders in one
group, the minority traders, induces different beliefs over the assets’ valuations than for the
other traders. For example, if s = XXO, groups 1 and 2 know that the true event is either
1 or 2, while group 3 (the minority traders) knows that the true event is either 2 or 3. In
the complementary events x(s) 2 f0; 3g, all traders observe the same number of X’s, and
therefore hold the same beliefs over the events x(s). We therefore refer to these events as
the homogeneous events. For example if s = XXX, all traders know that the true event is
either 2 or 3. Naturally, it follows that there are no minority traders in homogeneous events.
3.2 The FRE and PIE models
The experimental design endows traders with partial and private information about the true
event. Because the complexity of the CDA mechanism makes it extremely difficult to analyse
with standard game theoretical methods, we evaluate the market’s success at aggregating
information by comparing market prices against the fully revealing rational expectations
equilibrium (FRE) and the prior–information equilibrium (PIE) described in full below.
Table 1 details the FRE and PIE predicted prices of each asset  in the market and the
corresponding implied proportion of submitted beliefs in the post-market stage.14
The PIE describes the market clearing prices when risk-neutral traders use Bayes’ rule
to update their posteriors about the true event given their own private information and
condition their demands upon such posteriors. However, there is no belief updating following
trade, and consequently the true event is only partially revealed in prices. For example if
s = XXO, then traders in groups 1 and 2 will assign equal posteriors to the events 1 and 2,
whilst those in group 3 will assign equal posteriors to the events 2 and 3. As traders condition
their demand for assets on their posteriors, the corresponding market clearing prices are 0,
50, 50 and 0 for assets  = 0,  = 1,  = 2 and  = 3, respectively.15 Uniformed of the true
14 The models assume that prices are set only by the expected values of the assets given the traders’
beliefs. That is, we assume that traders are risk neutral and have no other motivations for trading other
than divergent beliefs.
15 Traders from groups 1 and 2 are willing to sell asset  = 3 at zero. Given group 3 traders are the
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Table 1: Predicted Prices and Beliefs.
Market Prices Submitted Beliefs
True Event p0 p1 p2 p3 B0 B1 B2 B3
Panel A: Fully revealing equilibrium rational expectations (FRE)
x(s) = 0 100 0 0 0 1.00 0 0 0
x(s) = 1 0 100 0 0 0 1.00 0 0
x(s) = 2 0 0 100 0 0 0 1.00 0
x(s) = 3 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 1.00
Panel B: Prior-information equilibrium (PIE)
x(s) = 0 50 50 0 0 0.50 0.50 0 0
x(s) = 1 0 50 50 0 0.17 0.50 0.33 0
x(s) = 2 0 50 50 0 0 0.33 0.50 0.17
x(s) = 3 0 0 50 50 0 0 0.50 0.50
p denotes the predicted price of asset  and Bj denotes the predicted proportion of traders
submitting beliefs b = j.
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event, traders in groups 1 and 2 will uniformly randomise between the responses b = 1 and
b = 2. Similarly, those in group 3 will randomise between the responses b = 2 and b = 3.
In contrast to the PIE, the FRE describes an outcome where risk-neutral traders not
only use Bayes’ law to update their posteriors but also continuously learn about the private
information of others from market prices. This endogenous process continues until no trader
can learn any more from prices and the true event is fully revealed in the prices. Since all
traders are fully informed about the true event by definition, this should be reflected in their
submitted beliefs.
In many respects, both equilibria describe some form of market aggregation. Where they
differ is on the issues as to whether the true event is partially (PIE) or fully (FRE) revealed in
prices. The expected market payoff in both PIE and FRE is 600. The expected post-market
payoff is 0 and 200 for the former and latter, respectively.
How prices might actually converge to the FRE remains an open question. There is an
extensive literature that discusses the dynamic behaviours of traders (e.g., Dubey et al., 1987;
Hellwig, 1982; Ostrovsky, 2012; Radner, 1979). However, the complexity of such models are
largely beyond the scope of our experimental design. Furthermore, Biais and Pouget (1999)
show that given the information asymmetry in our design, there should be no trade in
equilibrium, except at the FRE prices. Yet without trade at non FRE prices, it is difficult
to see how traders learn about the true state.
In the following subsection, we present a simple reasoning model describing the conver-
gence process supporting the FRE prices.16 As we later elaborate, counterfactual reasoning
by traders will play in integral role in the convergence process.
3.3 The reasoning model
The model builds on Jordan’s (1982) discussion of the way in which prices may first converge
to some ‘pre-equilibrium’ on the path to the FRE.17 Trade takes place over t = 1; 2; 3; 4 hypo-
thetical periods. Traders are risk-neutral, not capital constrained, always seek to maximise
minority in the population, the only market clearing price for asset 3 is zero.
16 We introduce the reasoning model to highlight the challenges and complexities in convergences to the
FRE. The model is not based on a game theoretic analysis of double auction market structure, does not
incorporate risk-aversion and does not include other motivations to trade other than differences in opinion.
17 Jordan’s (1982) model is sometimes known as the ‘Jordan Path’. Copeland and Friedman (1987) and
Plott and Sunder (1988) have noted that the convergence of asset prices to the FRE in their data is consistent
with the Jordan Path.
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payoffs and are non-strategic in the sense that they trade in each period as if it were the
last. Denote pt as the period t price of asset . Given the above, the model assumes that
behaviours at each period t are described by the following four stages:
Stage 1. Traders observe the period t  1 prices of each asset (i.e., pt 1).
Stage 2. Traders update their beliefs regarding the true event.
Stage 3. Traders condition their demands for assets given their updated posteriors or be-
liefs.
Stage 4. The market clears and period t prices are established.
To see how convergence to the FRE occurs in the reasoning model, first consider the case
where s = XXX or x(s) = 3 (homogeneous event). Here, all traders observe two type X
groups and therefore assign equal posteriors to the events 2 and 3. At period t = 1, traders
condition their asset demands on such posteriors. This results in the market clearing prices:
p21 = p
3
1 = 50 and p01 = p11 = 0 (the PIE prices). At period t = 2, traders observing the
previous period prices will reason the true event to be 3. The reasoning is as follows. If
the true event were 2, some traders would have observed one X and one O. Such traders
would assign a posterior probability of 0.5 to the event 1, driving p11 up to 50. Since p11 = 0,
this must mean that no trader observes only one other X ruling out event 2. Conditioning
their demands on the updated beliefs now results in the market clearing prices: p32 = 100
and p02 = p12 = p22 = 0 (the FRE prices). Since the true event is fully revealed in t = 2, there
should be no revisions to the prices in periods t = 3 and t = 4. This process of information
aggregation holds by symmetry for the s = OOO case.
Now consider the case where s = XXO or x(s) = 2 (heterogeneous event). Here,
traders in groups 1 and 2 observe one type X group and therefore assign equal posteriors
to the events 1 and 2. Conversely, the minority traders in group 3 observe two type X
groups and therefore assign equal posteriors to the events 2 and 3. At period t = 1, traders
condition their asset demands on such posteriors, resulting in the market clearing prices:
p11 = p
2
1 = 50 and p01 = p31 = 0 (the PIE prices).18 At period t = 2, the minority traders,
having observed non-zero prices for asset 1, can deduce that some of the other traders
observed a type O group. This rules out event 3 from being the true event, hence the true
18 Although group 3 traders value asset 3 at 50, those in groups 1 and 2 value asset 3 at 0. The excess
supply therefore drives the market clearing price of asset 3 towards 0.
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event must be x(s) = 2. In contrast, the non-minority traders (those in groups 1 and 2),
who already knew that there is at least one type O group receive no new information from
the prices, and therefore remain uninformed. Given the updated beliefs, there is still excess
demand for asset 1 by groups 1 and 2, leading to market clearing prices of p12 = p22 = 50 and
p02 = p
3
2 = 0.19 However, given their higher valuations, the market mechanism will allocate
asset 2 to the minority traders. At period t = 3, groups 1 and 2 again remain uninformed
of the true event. Given that the trade of asset 2 will now mostly involve group 3 traders,
though, the subsequent market clearing prices will be: p03 = p33 = 0, p13 = 50 and p23 = 100.20
At period t = 4, the non-minority traders observing that p23 > p13, should conclude that the
true event is x(s) = 2. As traders condition their asset demands on their updated beliefs, we
arrive at the market clearing prices: p04 = p14 = p34 = 0 and p24 = 100, the FRE prices.21 This
process of information aggregation holds by symmetry for all states where x(s) 2 f1; 2g.
The main results of the reasoning model are as follows. Firstly, convergence to the FRE
prices is possible for all states and events. Secondly, on the path of convergence towards
the FRE, prices go through the PIE prices. Finally, minority traders (heterogeneous event)
learn about the true event before the other traders and are ‘instrumental’ in driving prices
towards the FRE.
Some comments
The model assumes that traders only update their beliefs on observed prices. In CDA
markets, traders can also learn from the volume of transactions or the unfilled bid and
ask prices. Will these additional elements influence the information aggregation process?
Suppose that traders only update their beliefs on observed transaction volumes. When
s = XXX, transactions should be concentrated on assets 2 and 3. So again, traders will
only learn about the true event through reasoning about why transactions for asset 1 is
relatively low. When s = XXO, transactions should be concentrated on assets 1 and
2.22 As such, minority traders should still learn about the true state before the others.
19 If leveraged short-sales are permitted, then p12 may converge to 0 as traders in group 3 act to short the
asset.
20 The intuition here is that because asset 2 is all held by the group 3 traders, ‘Bertrand’ like competition
between informed traders drive the price of asset 2 up to 100.
21 An interesting corollary of the model is that if there is only one minority trader, as opposed to group
of traders, prices may never converge to the FRE.
22 The population of group 3 traders (minority traders) who will purchase asset 3 is substantially smaller
than those in groups 1 and 2, who will mainly transact in assets 1 and 2.
13
Consequently, transaction volumes for asset 2 will increase relative to those for asset 1 as
minority traders concentrate their purchases on the true asset. Non minority traders will
thus learn the true event to be 2. Thus, the additional elements do not seem to alter the
information aggregation process in any substantial way.
The model suggests that convergence to the FRE might be more challenging for the
heterogeneous information events given that minority subjects must first be informed about
the true event and be instrumental at driving prices towards the FRE.23 At the same time,
convergence to the FRE also requires agents to employ counterfactual reasoning. In hetero-
geneous information events, agents make inferences from actual observed trade. In the ho-
mogeneous information events, in contrast, agents deduce the true event from not observing
trade on an asset, which would have been traded in some counterfactual event. Recognising
that empirical (experimental and otherwise) data are often noisy, and some trade is likely to
happen, it is not clear whether low volumes or prices are enough for agents to be confident
at ascertaining the true event. Even complete market inactivity is somewhat ambiguous, as
it is not clear how much time should be allowed to elapse before concluding that there is no
demand for the asset. Lack of trade may be explained, for example, by agents concentrating
on other parts of the market. For these reasons, convergence to FRE prices may depend on
the information structure, with homogeneous beliefs leading to slower convergence.
4 Experimental results
To study prices in dynamic CDA markets, we partition the market data into time windows
of 30 seconds, each indexed by t = (1; 2; 3; ::; 10). Denote by pt the mean transaction price
for asset  in window t. For example, p32 corresponds to the mean transaction price of
asset 3 within the 30–60 seconds time window. Where pt cannot be computed as there are
no transactions in the time window, we employ the carry forward rule, substituting pt with
the last known computed price.24 As such, pt will always reflect the most recent price for
23Note that because t refers to hypothetical periods, it does not necessarily imply that convergence to the
FRE is slower for the heterogeneous relative to homogeneous information states.
24 The carry forward rule is performed recursively until a price is determined. That is, we first set
pt = p

t 1. If this cannot be determined, we then set pt = pt 2 and so forth. If no transaction of the asset
occurred since the beginning of trader, we set p1 = 0. It was rather rare that an asset was not traded at all
in t = 1, occurring for only 24 of 280 (8.6%) of traded assets, 15 instances of which pertain to an asset that
all traders can rule out as the true asset at the beginning of trade (e.g.,  = 0 in s = XXO).
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asset . Where appropriate, we will also consider the prices without the carry forward rule,
denoted by pt . That is, pt = 0 if no transactions are observed.
Since all events of the form x(s) are a one-to-one mapping to assets, we will sometimes
use both terms interchangeably. For any true event x(s), define the alternative event as the
non-true event to which traders assign a positive posterior given their private information
at the start of the market. Since this will differ amongst the minority and non-minority
traders, we use Alt-M and Alt-NM to denote the alternative event for the former and latter,
respectively. Finally, for any true event, define the implausible events as those which all
traders assign zero posterior to given their private information at the start of the market.
For example if x(s) = 2, then assets 0, 1, 2 and 3 are the implausible, Alt-NM, true, and
Alt-M assets, respectively. If x(s) = 0, then assets 0 and 1 are the true and Alt-NM assets,
respectively, while assets 2 and 3 are the implausible assets.
Figures 1 and 2 present the median pt and submitted beliefs for homogeneous and het-
erogeneous private information events, respectively. The rows in each figure correspond to
prices for the true, Alt-NM, Alt-M, and implausible assets. The header of each panel details
the round, followed by the number of sessions which data is pooled from and the correspond-
ing mean submitted belief in parenthesis. The solid and dash horizontal lines on each panel
detail the FRE and PIE prices, respectively. For example, the top left panel of Figure 1
corresponds to the the median pt of the true asset over the first round. The header shows
that the round-1 true event was homogeneous in three of the seven sessions, and that 42%
of subjects’ submitted beliefs corresponded to the true event.
There are several indications of learning over the ten rounds. We first consider purchases
at a price of above 100 ECU. Such purchases might seem ‘irrational’ given that the maximum
value of any asset is 100 ECU. Note, however, that this is not necessarily the case. For
example, a trader might be willing to buy an asset she knows to be worthless at a price of
120 ECU, if she believes that this will influence the beliefs of other traders and enable her
to sell five units of the same asset at a price of 30 ECU, or if she believes that she will be
able to resale the asset at a higher price. We find that 19% of all purchases in the first five
rounds were at a price of above 100 ECU, decreasing to 9% of all purchases in the last five
rounds. Furthermore, whilst 79% of subjects made a seemingly irrational purchase at least
once in the first five rounds, only 35% did so in the last five rounds. See the appendix for
more details.25 Importantly, the persistence of such purchases suggests that there are still
25 In fact, one of these subjects – call her subject A – was responsible for nearly 25% of all purchases
above 100 ECU in the last 5 rounds. However, all of such purchases for subject A pertained to the true
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some subjects who behave like noise traders (e.g., De-Long et al., 1990).
Turning our attention to price dynamics, we observe that the true asset often transacted
at close to 100 ECU. Consistent with the FRE and PIE predictions, prices of the implausible
and Alt-M assets are converging towards zero, but only in rounds 6–10. Finally, prices for
the Alt-NM asset seem to converge towards 100 ECU in rounds 1–4, 50 ECU in rounds 5–6
and finally, 0 ECU in rounds 7–10. To acknowledge the role of experience, we separate the
data in the following analyses into ‘Inexperienced’ (rounds 1–5) and ‘Experienced’ (rounds
6–10) subjects.26
In the following, we will first address RQ1, investigating whether Arrow-Debreu markets
can be successful at aggregating dispersed private information into prices and revealing the
true event. Orthogonal to this, we will also investigate whether the nature of information
aggregation might be dependent on the information structure, more specifically, whether
price and belief convergence differ between homogeneous and heterogeneous events. Finally,
we study the behaviours of minority subjects to investigate RQ2.
4.1 Information aggregation
Our approach seeks to investigate the question of information aggregation from three differ-
ent angles. Since relative asset prices can be interpreted as the markets’ prediction about
the true event, we will first investigate whether the markets are often correct (i.e., the true
asset is priced higher than the other assets). Thereafter, we will focus on the issue of arbi-
trage opportunities, such as when prices of the various assets do not sum up to 100 ECU.
The intuition here is that subjects may learn about the true event at different t, resulting
in disagreements and consequently arbitrage opportunities. However, such arbitrage op-
portunities should also be eliminated if information aggregation is successful. Finally, we
will benchmark the FRE against the PIE to examine if prices are relatively closer to either
equilibria.
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Assets A and B are the highest and second highest price assets at window t, respectively, with
correspond prices pAt and pBt . The constant   1 captures the extent to which pAt is higher than
pBt . For a given , ft shows the frequency to which the market has “picked a true event” and ft
the frequency to which the market is correct. Specifically, for  = 1, ft is the proportion of time
in which the prices reveal the underlying true event.
Figure 3: Highest and second highest price assets.
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4.1.1 Relative prices
From Figures 1 and 2, we note that prices for the Alt-M and implausible assets are consis-
tently lower than those for the Alt-NM and true assets. Indeed, transactions of the former
two assets are also relatively less frequent. These observations are helpful since they suggest
that markets often excluded the Alt-M and implausible assets as candidates for the true
event. In this case, our analysis can focus on the relative prices of the Alt-NM and true
assets.
To make such comparisons, we will define assets A and B as the highest and second
highest priced assets at time window t, respectively, with the corresponding prices pAt and
pBt .27 We derive the following two frequencies for some   1:
ft: The frequency to which pAt  pBt at window t.
f t : The frequency to which pAt  pBt conditional on A being the true asset at window t.
For  = 1, f t reflects the proportion of markets in which the true asset was priced higher
than the other assets. Thus, f 10 measures the proportion of times in which the final prices
reveal the true event. This happens overall in 52 of the 70 (74.3%) markets included in the
experiment, or 29 of the 35 (82.86%) markets with experienced subjects. In each of the final
four rounds, final prices revealed the true event in six of the seven sessions.
Values of  larger than 1 capture the extent to which asset A is priced higher than asset
B. Intuitively, ft captures the markets’ candidate true asset at time t given the criterion .
For example when  = 2, then ft details the ratio of observations which the price of asset
A is at least twice that of asset B in window t – data aggregated over all sessions. In this
case, f t  ft can be interpreted as the frequency to which the markets are correct (e.g., the
frequency to which the true asset is priced at least  times higher than the Alt-NM asset at
time t). Inversely, (ft   f t ) details the frequency to which the markets are incorrect.28
Figure 3 details the ft and f t for  = 1; 1:5; 2; 2:5; 3.29 A few observations are apparent
from the figure. First, for  > 1, f t is very close to ft, implying that traders are sometimes
asset. Furthermore, irrational purchases were often between the range of 101-120. Perhaps, subject A might
be using the prices to signal the true event to others.
26 As noted by Forsythe and Lundholm (1990), experience with the trading mechanism or experimental
design is crucial in giving markets a better chance at succeeding.
27 Prices for assets A and B here are derived applying the carry forward rule.
28 The FRE predicts that ft and ft are unity for all   1. In contrast, the PIE predicts that ft and ft
are zero for all  > 1.
29 See the appendix for ft and ft for  = 1; 1:1; 1:2; 1:3; 1:4; 1:5.
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incorrect in identifying the true asset, but rarely by a large margin. Alternatively, when
markets clearly favour one asset over the others, they are almost always correct.
Second, experience has a strong effect on information aggregation. When subjects are
inexperienced, f10 is approximately 0.35 and 0.10 when  = 1:5 and  = 2, respectively,
suggesting that final trading prices do not discriminate between the assets by much. Fur-
thermore, the plots are rather flat, indicating that discrimination doesn’t improve by much
across the trading period. For experienced subjects, in contrast, ft and f t are very close to
each other. Discrimination clearly develops as trade proceeds, as reflected in the upwards
trends in the plots, culminating in f 10 at approximately 0.60 and 0.51 when  = 1:5 and
 = 2, respectively. The markets were, therefore, quite efficient in discriminating between
the true asset and the other assets, with the true asset priced at at least twice the other
asset in 51% of all observations.
4.1.2 Arbitrage opportunities
To study arbitrage opportunities, we define SUMt =
P
 p

t as the sum of al prices at
window t.30 The thick black line on Figure 4 plots the median SUMt over all sessions. Here,
we clearly observe SUMt to be decreasing with t for both inexperienced and experienced
subjects, indicating that arbitrage opportunities are reduced with t.31 Are they ‘eliminated’
at the end of the market?
To study this, we focus on the prices at window t = 10. Panel A of Table 2 details
the mean SUM10 apportioned by sessions and experience. We clearly observe SUM10 to be
higher than 100 for inexperienced subjects. Indeed, aggregating over all sessions, we find
SUM10 to be significantly greater from 100 (Signrank,  < 0:001, n = 35 observations) for
inexperienced subjects. This clearly suggests that arbitrage opportunities are still apparent
at the end of the market.
The picture is nuance for experienced subjects. Firstly, we observe some heterogeneity
amongst the sessions, with SUM10 be noticeably different from 100 for sessions 1, 4 and 5
and less so for sessions 3, 6 and 7. Aggregating over all sessions, we do not find SUM10 to be
significantly different from 100 for experienced subjects (Signrank,  = 0:13, n = 35).32 We
30 Neglecting the carry forward rule here to avoid double counting.
31 Notice that SUMt for inexperienced subjects are frequently above 100 ECU. This is mainly due to the
activities of those subjects who purchased assets at prices above 100 ECU.
32 For further robustness checks, we also regressed SUM10 on a constant – fixed effect regression model.
For inexperienced subjects, the constant is positive and significantly different from 100 at the 1% level. For
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Figure 4: Median SUMt over all sessions.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for SUM10 and DIFF10.
Variables: SUM10 =
P
 p

10 and DIFF10 = MADP10  MADF10
Inexperienced Experienced
Variable SUM10 DIFF10 SUM10 DIFF10
Panel A: Data aggregated by sessions
Session 1 (mean) 248 -1 143 4
Session 2 (mean) 134 6 80 13
Session 3 (mean) 98 3 86 4
Session 4 (mean) 353 -4 183 -6
Session 5 (mean) 314 0 141 -1
Session 6 (mean) 190 -3 103 13
Session 7 (mean) 175 -16 98 10
iAll sessions (mean) 216
(n=35)
 3
(n=35)
119
(n=35)
5
(n=35)
Wilcoxon Signrank
Null: SUM10 = 100  < 0:01  = 0:13
Null: DIFF10 = 0  = 0:09  = 0:02
Panel B: Data aggregated by homogeneous and heterogeneous events
Homogeneous (mean) 277
(n=7)
 3
(n=7)
112
(n=10)
0
(n=10)
iiHeterogeneous (mean) 201
(n=28)
 2
(n=28)
122
(n=25)
7
(n=25)
Mann-Whitney (Homo vs. Hetero)  = 0:13  = 0:83  = 0:66  = 0:12
The variable SUMt =
P
 p

t describes the sum of all prices at window t. The variable DIFFt =
MADPt  MADFt describes the difference between the mean absolute deviation of prices from the
PIE (MADP ) and FRE (MADF ).
i Aggregating over all sessions, we use the fixed effect model to regress SUM10 (DIFF10) over a
constant, where  and  imply that the constant is significantly different from 100 (0) at the 1%
and 5% levels, respectively.
ii Aggregating over all sessions, we use the fixed effect model to regress the dependent variable
(SUM10 or DIFF10) over a constant and a situation dummy for Heterogeneous information events.
 and  imply that the situation dummy is significantly different from zero at the 1% and 5% levels,
respectively.
23
thus cannot exclude the possibility that arbitrage opportunities are eliminated at the end of
the market.
4.1.3 Deviations of prices from the FRE and PIE
To benchmark the FRE against the PIE, we compute the mean absolute deviations of pt
from the former and latter, henceforth known as MADFt and MADPt , respectively.33 Note
that the symmetrical nature of the FRE and PIE imply that MADFt and MADPt will often
be close and at times even identical.
Given the above, we define DIFFt = MADPt  MADFt as the difference between both
mean absolute deviations at window t. Interpretations here should be straightforward: A
positive (negative) DIFFt implies that prices at window t are relatively closer to the FRE
(PIE). This relationship also implies that DIFFt will converge to 25 (-25) as prices converge
to the FRE (PIE). Therefore, any relative measure between the FRE and PIE only needs to
focus on the sign ofDIFFt. Information aggregation is also expected to be a dynamic process
from traders continuously about the true event from prices. Furthermore, the reasoning
model in Section 3.3 predicts that the path of convergence to the FRE will also go through
the PIE. In this case, we should typically expect DIFFt to start in the negative region and
increase with t towards the positive region. However, the rate of increase is also expected to
decrease with t.
The construct of DIFFt is also convenient given that variations will only depend on the
prices of the true and Alt-NM assets, the two most frequently traded asset types. That is,
for fixed prices of the true and Alt-NM assets, variations to the implausible and Alt-M assets
will not influence DIFFt given that such variations shift the MADFt and MADPt by the
same magnitude.
The thick solid line on Figure 5 details the median DIFFt, aggregating over all sessions.
For inexperienced subjects, we observe DIFFt to often be zero (i.e., prices are not getting
closer to the FRE nor the PIE with t.) This is consistent with the observations in Section
4.1.1, where we find that prices for the true and Alt-NM assets are often not very different.
For experienced subjects, we often observe DIFFt to be negative at the start of the round
and increase progressively over t. To see the evolution of prices more formally, we regress
DIFFt on the time trend t and t2. The fixed-effects coefficient estimates for experienced
experience subjects, the constant is positive but not significantly different from 100 at the 5% level.
33 More formally, MADFt =
P
 jpt   pj=4 and MADPt =
P
 jpt   p^j=4, where p and p^ are the FRE
and PIE prices, respectively.
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The header of each panel details the round. The variable DIFFt = MADPt  MADFt describes
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prices are relatively closer to the FRE and PIE, respectively.
Figure 5: Median DIFFt over all sessions.
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and inexperienced subjects are reported as follows (robust standard errors in parenthesis):34
^DIFF t =  6:31
(1:49)
+ 0:92
(0:64)
t  0:06
(1:49)
t2 n = 350 (Inexperience)
^DIFF t =  7:48
(1:73)
+ 1:69
(0:72)
t  0:05
(0:06)
t2 n = 350 (Experience)
The negative intercept term in both regressions imply that prices towards the start of the
round are significantly closer to the PIE. For inexperienced subjects, the coefficient estimates
for t and t2 are not significant at the 10% level. In contrast, the t coefficient for experienced
subjects is both significant ( = 0:02) and positive. The t2 coefficient for experience subjects
is negative but not significant ( = 0:42). The estimates therefore suggest that only for
experienced subjects do prices seem to move away from the PIE towards to the FRE.
To test whether markets are indeed successful at aggregating dispersed private informa-
tion and revealing the true event through the equilibrium prices, we now focus on the end
of the markets (i.e., window t = 10). Panel A of Table 2 details the mean DIFF10 appor-
tioned by sessions and experience. Aggregating over all sessions, we do not find DIFF10
to be significantly different from zero (Signrank,  = 0:093, n = 35). In contrast, we find
DIFF10 to be positive and significantly (Signrank,  = 0:027, n = 35) different from zero
for experienced subjects.35 Together with the observations from Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, the
evidence here leads us to our first result.
Result 1 For experienced subjects we find that (i) Markets frequently price the true asset
significantly higher than the other assets, (ii) There is no significant evidence of arbitrage
opportunities at the end of the round, (iii) Prices move towards the FRE and away from
the PIE within a round, and (iv) End of round prices are significantly closer to the FRE
relative to the PIE. These observations do not hold for inexperienced subjects. The evidence
therefore suggests that markets can be successful at information aggregation, even when the
task is challenging and requires market participants to employ counterfactual reasoning, but
only when market participants have experience with the trading mechanism or market design.
34 To setup our panel data model, we defined each round as an “independent” market, with the time
variable t. Therefore, we estimated the fixed-effects model, clustering the standard errors at the session
level. We also considered the estimates from GLLAMM (Rabe-Hesket et al., 2005) linear regression model,
a class of Multilevel mixed models, which allows for a hierarchy of random effects for windows nested in
rounds nested in sessions. The conclusions are similar.
35 For further robustness checks, we also regressed DIFF10 on a constant – fixed effect regression model.
For inexperienced subjects, the constant is negative but not significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
For experience subjects, the constant is positive and significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
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For further robustness checks, we also employ the approach of Plott and Sunder (1988)
and Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) where only the last (P1 price) and last 5 (P5 prices)
transactions prices of each asset are considered. For inexperienced subjects, we find P1
(Signrank,  = 0:859, n = 35) and P5 (Signrank,  = 0:022, n = 35) prices to be somewhat
closer to the PIE. In contrast, P1 (Signrank,  = 0:044, n = 35) and P5 (Signrank,  = 0:025,
n = 35) prices are significantly closer to the FRE for experienced subjects.
4.1.4 Homogeneous vs. heterogeneous information events
Building on Result 1, we now investigate whether the information aggregation properties of
markets depend on the information structure (i.e., homogeneous or heterogeneous events).36
First consider those instances where the true and Alt-NM assets are the highest (A) and
second highest (B) priced assets at window t. Focusing on window t = 10, we compute
the ratio pA10=pB10, the relative price of the true over the Alt-NM asset. This ratio does not
differ significantly between homogeneous and heterogeneous events for inexperienced (Mann-
Whitney,  = 0:412, n = 35) and for experienced (Mann-Whitney,  = 0:372, n = 35)
subjects.
Turning our attention to arbitrage opportunities, Figure 4 details the median SUMt
for homogeneous and heterogeneous events, apportioned by rounds. With the exception of
round 4, there does not seem to be any obvious differences in SUMt for both events. Re-
stricting our analysis to prices at the end of the round, Panel B of Table 2 details the mean
SUM10 apportioned by events and experience. Aggregating over all sessions, we do not find
SUM10 for homogeneous and heterogeneous events to be significantly different amongst in-
experienced (Mann-Whitney,  = 0:13, n = 35) and experienced (Mann-Whitney,  = 0:66,
n = 35) subjects. Similarly, we do not find SUM10 for experienced subjects to be signifi-
cantly different from 100 for homogeneous (Signrank,  = 0:54, n = 10) and heterogeneous
(Signrank,  = 0:20, n = 23) events.
Finally, Figure 5 details the DIFFt for homogeneous and heterogeneous events, appor-
tioned by rounds. Now with the exception of round 5, there does not seem to be any
differences in DIFFt amongst both events. Panel B of Table 2 also provides some summary
statistics for DIFF10 over the homogeneous and heterogeneous events. We again do not find
any significant differences in DIFF10 for inexperienced (Mann-Whitney,  = 0:83, n = 35)
36 For inexperienced subjects, there were 7 and 28 occurrences of homogeneous and heterogeneous in-
formation events, respectively. For experienced subjects, the corresponding occurrences are 10 and 23,
respectively.
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and experienced (Mann-Whitney,  = 0:12, n = 35) subjects. This leads us to the second
result.
Result 2 For inexperienced and experienced subjects, we find that homogeneous and het-
erogeneous events do not result in significant end of round differences in (i) The ratio of
highest and second highest priced assets, (ii) Arbitrage opportunities, and (iii) Differences
in the mean absolute deviation of prices from the PIE and FRE. This suggests that the in-
formation aggregation properties of markets are independent of whether traders are endowed
with homogeneous or heterogeneous private information about the true event.
4.2 Post-market stage
Turning our attention to the post-market stage, we define a subject to be correct if her
submitted beliefs correspond to the true event, i.e., b = x(s). The corresponding proportions
of correct inexperienced and experienced subjects are 0.51 and 0.71, respectively.
Given that both PIE and FRE make precise predictions as to the submitted beliefs of
minority and non-minority traders, it seems natural to investigate how such predictions
match subjects’ submitted beliefs. To do so, we compute the mean absolute deviations of
the submitted beliefs from the PIE and FRE beliefs.37
Submitted beliefs for inexperienced subjects are significantly closer to the PIE prediction
(Signrank,  < 0:01, n = 35). This may not be surprising given that Result 1 suggests
that the true event is unlikely to be reflected in prices. It is perhaps more surprising that
beliefs submitted by experienced subjects are not significantly closer to either the FRE or
the PIE prediction (Signrank,  = 0:79, n = 35) despite the fact that subjects could learn
the true event by looking at the closing market prices. This result reveals that individual
learning is not a necessary condition for successful information aggregation in prices. That
is, it possible for market prices to reflect the true event even when a sizeable proportion of
traders remain uninformed of the true event.
This result is consistent with the marginal trader hypothesis (e.g., Forsythe and Lund-
holm, 1990), which posits that it is sufficient to have a few sophisticated traders that un-
derstand how market prices are related to the states of the world in order to drive prices
37 For example if x(s) = 1, then the FRE predicts that all 4 minority subjects and all 8 non-minority
subjects will submit beliefs b = 1. In contrast, the PIE predicts that beliefs b = 0 and b = 1 will be each
submitted by 2 minority subjects. In addition, beliefs b = 1 and b = 2 will each be submitted by 4 minority
subjects.
28
towards the FRE. We explore this possibility by using the post-market stage to identify the
‘sophisticated’ traders independent of their market behaviour. We define expert traders to be
those who submitted a correct belief in at least nine out of the ten markets they participated
in. This categorization yields 24% (20 of 84) expert traders.38 Table 3 presents mixed-effects
regressions comparing the expert traders with the other traders. Columns (1) and (2) reveal
that expert traders made larger profits, and held higher share of the true asset at the end
of trade. Looking at the expert traders’ purchase decisions, we see in Columns (3) and (4)
that experts were more judicious in their purchase decisions, making fewer purchases, and
being more likely to purchase the true asset compared to non-experts. The MAD in col-
umn (6) of the table, defined as the mean absolute deviation of the trader’s purchases from
the FRE, shows that the experts’ mean purchase price is indeed significantly closer to the
FRE price. To further test whether expert traders were more likely to push prices closer to
the FRE, we look at how prices move with each purchase made by the trader.39 We define
convergent purchases to be purchases made at a price that is at least as close to the FRE
price as in the preceding transaction of the same asset.40 Column (5) in Table 3 details the
share of convergent purchases out of the trader’s total purchases in the round. Close to 61%
of non-experts’ purchases do not move the price away from the FRE compared to 65% for
expert traders. This difference increases to nine percent points and becomes significant at
the 10% level if we restrict the analysis to experienced traders only.
Returning to the comparison of homogeneous and heterogeneous events, we find that
inexperienced subjects are more likely to submit a correct belief in a heterogeneous event than
in a homogeneous event (0.69 vs. 0.39, Fisher exact,  < 0:001). With experience, however,
we see a substantial improvement even in the homogeneous events. Experienced subjects are
roughly equally likely to be correct in both event types, submitting correct beliefs in 0.73
and 0.65 of instances for the heterogeneous and homogeneous events, respectively (Fisher
exact,  = 0:152).41 It thus appears that homogeneous events pose greater difficulty for
38 Only four traders submitted correct beliefs in all ten rounds. The results are robust to setting the
criterion at 7, 8, or 10 correct beliefs.
39 Selling decisions are more difficult to analyse since even traders who are informed about the true event
should seek to sell assets at prices away from the FRE.
40 Suppose that the sequence of purchase prices for an asset is 75, 79, 122, 60, 89 and 89 with the FRE
price being 100. Then only the second, fifth and sixth purchases will be defined as convergent as they are
no further away from 100 than the preceding purchase. If the FRE price is instead 0, then only fourth and
sixth can be defined as convergent purchases.
41 Alternatively, we can also consider the mean absolute deviations of submitted beliefs from the FRE
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Table 3: Expert traders.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profits True in
inventory
Total
purchases
Proportion
true
Proportion
convergent
MAD
EXPERT 196.048 9.814 -2.429 0.161 0.044 -8.651
(86.193) (3.946) (1.325) (0.040) (0.029) (2.240)
Round -0.038 -0.481 0.008 0.004 -4.650
(0.157) (0.107) (0.004) (0.004) (0.290)
Constant 553.322 22.254 12.940 0.352 0.584 73.898
(24.561) (0.836) (1.333) (0.040) (0.031) (3.099)
N 840 840 840 553 768 768
Mixed-effects regressions with random effects for subjects and robust standard errors clustered at the
session level. Note that profits do not change across rounds as trade is zero-sum.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01.
traders to discover the true state of the world. Notwithstanding, this does not impede price
convergence. This conclusion should be taken cautiously, however, as the post-market beliefs
may be influenced by the ex-ante low probability of the homogeneous events.42 Result 3
summarises:
Result 3 Inexperienced traders remain uninformed about the true state of the world. Al-
though with experience market prices converge to the FRE prices, traders remain largely
predictions. For inexperienced subjects, submitted beliefs are closer to the FRE predictions in heterogeneous
relative to homogeneous information events (Mann-Whitney,  < 0:001, n = 35). In contrast, we find no
significant differences for experienced subjects (Mann-Whitney,  = 0:328, n = 35).
42 This explanation implies a failure to properly apply Bayes’ rule. To see why, first consider the case where
s = OOO (homogeneous event). By Bayes’ rule, each uninformed subject should assign equal probability
to the events 0 and 1. However, the prior probability of nature choosing event 1 is also three times more
than 0. Thus, the failure to properly apply Bayes’ rule will lead to uninformed subjects incorrectly assigning
greater weights to the event 1. Now consider the case where s = XXO (heterogeneous event). Traders in
groups 1 and 2 should believe that events 1 and 2 are possible. Since nature chooses events 1 and 2 each
with probability 3=8, such subjects should not weight one event more than the other, even when they fail
to properly apply Bayes rule. However, for traders in group 3, the failure to properly apply Bayes’ rule will
lead them to put greater weights on event 2, given that the prior probability on event 3 is 1=8. Thus, the
proportion of correct subjects will be more than 1=2.
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Table 4: Minority traders.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Correct
beliefs
Profits True in
inventory
Total
purchases
Proportion
true
Proportion
conver-
gent
MAD
Minority 0.106 -6.006 2.204 2.928 0.002 -0.009 -6.672
(0.045) (30.259) (0.815) (0.441) (0.020) (0.023) (2.033)
Round 0.031 0.022 -0.462 0.006 0.003 -4.835
(0.009) (0.189) (0.080) (0.004) (0.005) (0.246)
Constant 0.459 602.002 23.789 11.653 0.401 0.594 72.497
(0.047) (10.086) (1.125) (0.414) (0.024) (0.026) (1.507)
N 636 636 636 636 405 581 581
OLS regressions with subject fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the session level. Only
data from the heterogeneous events is included. Note that profits do not change across rounds as trade
is zero-sum.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
uninformed. There is some evidence that a few sophisticated traders both succeed in discov-
ering the true state and are instrumental in driving prices towards the FRE.
4.3 Minority Report
The reasoning model of Section 3.3 predicts that minority traders in the heterogeneous
events learn about the true state before the non-minority traders, and are influential at
driving prices towards the FRE. In this section we test these predictions using the market
behaviour and submitted beliefs of minority traders.
Table 4 provides some evidence supporting the model’s predictions. Comparing behaviour
in the heterogeneous events within subjects, we find that when (exogenously) placed in the
minority role, traders are better informed, as measured by post-market beliefs (p < 0:05
for the marginal effect in the regression reported in Column (1)). Column (4) shows that
minority traders are more active, making 9% more purchases than non-minorities. They are,
however, not more likely to purchase the true asset or to make a convergent purchase, as
seen in Columns (5) and (6). Notwithstanding, Column (7) reveals that minority traders
buy at closer to the FRE price, suggesting that when minority traders do make a convergent
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purchase, their purchase price moves a larger distance from the preceding traded price to-
wards the FRE price. Finally, Columns (2) and (3) show that, at the end of trade, minority
traders hold a larger share of the true asset in their inventory, but do not make a larger
profit overall compared to rounds in which they are cast in the non-minority role. Result 4
summarises these observations.
Result 4 Relative to non-minority subjects, minority subjects (i) Are significantly more
likely to be correct, (ii) Hold a significantly greater proportion of the true asset in their
inventory and (iii) Purchase additional assets at prices significantly closer to the FRE. This
provides some tentative evidence that minority subjects are informed about the true event
before the others and are influential at driving prices towards the FRE.
If minority traders are better informed, why are they unable to leverage their knowledge
to purchase the true asset at a discount and thus improve their payoffs? A central claim of
the efficient market hypothesis (e.g., Fama, 1970) is that if markets are strong-form efficient,
then any trader seeking to exploit his private information immediately reveals the same
information from his demand of assets, thus negating any possible gains. Furthermore,
competitive bidding between minority subjects might also reduce the scope for such gains.
The above suggests that whilst minority traders may initially be able to profit their
knowledge of the true event, such gains will eventually be eroded over time. To study the
development of minority gains over time , we compute the liquidation value (i.e., how much
the portfolio of cash and assets is worth after the loan of 5,000 ECU is returned) of the
trader’s portfolio at window t. We then regress for each window t, the liquidation value on
the minority subjects, using fixed subject effects with session level clustering. The minority
dummy coefficient, 1;t, thus captures the expected difference in liquidation value between
the minority and non-minority roles at window t. Figure 6 plots the estimate for 1;t at
each window t. The hump shape distribution of 1 suggests that the liquidation value of a
minority trader increases during the early periods of the round (i.e., between windows 2–5),
with the gap disappearing as trade proceeds. However, the differences are not significant at
the 5% level.
5 Conclusion
This study is motivated by the question as to whether markets are able to aggregate dis-
persed private information about the true state of the world into prices. We consider an
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Figure 6: Coefficient estimate of 1;t.
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experimental design which allows us to endow traders with homogeneous and heterogeneous
private information about the true event. With this framework, we advance a simple model
which shows that markets converge to the fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium
for both homogeneous and heterogeneous cases, indicating that the true event will be re-
flected in prices. However, the process of convergence to the FRE is challenging and requires
traders to perform counterfactual reasoning. A post-market stage allows us to estimate
individual learning independent of market activity, and to correlate learning and market
behaviour.
We find that markets can be successful at aggregating information, but only when market
participants have experience with the trading mechanisms. When traders are experienced,
the market prices successfully aggregate and reflect the true state, even when traders start out
with induced homogeneous beliefs. The requirement for counterfactual reasoning does not
appear to impede market convergence. Although the prices reveal the true state, individual
learning is strongly constrained. Consistent with the marginal trader hypothesis, we find
that a limited number of sophisticated traders is sufficient to drive market prices towards the
rational expectations equilibrium. The role traders play in price convergence depends both
on endogenous characteristics and on information asymmetries. The last point suggests that
even when some traders gain insider knowledge, markets can efficiently price this knowledge.
Taken together, this paper extends the pioneering work by Plott and Sunder (1988) on
information aggregation in an environment which we believe to be significantly more compli-
cated. The new design allows us to explore questions of information structure complexity and
symmetry, and compare market results to directly elicited post-market beliefs. We conclude
that markets composed of experienced traders are able to successfully aggregate dispersed
information even in a challenging environment, and even if only a minority of the traders
become fully informed in the process.
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions
(The experimental instructions were written in Hebrew. Below is the English Translation
version)
In this experiment, we are going to simulate a stock market environment where you are
able to buy and sell certificates. All payoffs in this experiment will be denoted in Experimen-
tal Currency (ECU). The experiment will consist of 2 practice rounds (non-paying) followed
by 10 experimental rounds. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select
one of the 10 experimental rounds, and your earnings in that round will be paid to you in
cash at the exchange rate of 15 ECU to 1 Shekels. In addition, we will also pay you a 25 (15
in Session 1) Shekel show up fee.
We will now describe each experimental round. At the beginning of each round, you will
be randomly assigned into either Group A, Group B or Group C. Each group will consist of
exactly 4 subjects. Thereafter, the computer will choose a type for each group, which could
either be X or O with equal chances. This implies that there is a 1 in 2 chance of your group
type being X and a 1 in 2 chance of your group type being O. The table below describes all
possible type combinations for the three groups and the chance for each combination. You
will not know your own group type but will be able to observe the group type of all other
groups.
Group A X O X X X O O O
Group B X X O X O X O O
Group C X X X O O O X O
Probability of
combination
1 in 8 1 in 8 1 in 8 1 in 8 1 in 8 1 in 8 1 in 8 1 in 8
Total number of
Type X groups
3 2 2 2 2 1 1 0
You will first enter the trading stage, where you have the opportunity to buy and sell 4
classes of certificates labelled S0, S1, S2 and S3. Each participant begins the trading stage
with 6 units of each class of certificate and a loan of 5,000 ECU cash, which you will pay
back at the end of the round. You buy and sell certificates through a continuous double
auction mechanism and the trading period will last for exactly 300 seconds (5 minutes). We
shall now describe the mechanism.
The Double Auction Trading Mechanism
38
Each participant can buy or sell only one class of certificate at each time. Participates
will first select the class of certificate they would like to buy or sell and thereafter decide
submit the “Bid” and “Ask” price to the market.
• Ask price (between 0 and 200 ECU) = How much you are willing to sell a unit of
certificate for.
• Bid price (between 0 and 200 ECU) = How much you are willing to buy a unit of
certificate for.
The “Bid” and “Ask” prices of all participants will be instantaneously reflected in the
columns: “Market Ask Prices” and “Market Bid Prices”
• Buy: To buy a certificate, simply select the price in the “Market Ask Price” column
and click the “Buy” Button
• Sell: To sell a certificate, simply select the price in the “Market Bid Price” column and
click the “Sell” Button
The column “Latest Transaction Price” describes the history of transaction prices for each
class of certificate. Please note that you are able to buy and sell any class of certificates.
At the end of round, your certificates Ð S0, S1, S2 and S3 Ð will be redeemed at a specific
value that depends on the total number of type X groups in the round.
• If there was no type X group, security S0 will be redeemed at 100 ECU and the others
at 0 ECU
• If there was only one type X group, security S1 will be redeemed at 100 ECU and the
others at 0 ECU
• If there were only two type X groups, security S2 will be redeemed at 100 ECU and
the others at 0 ECU
• If there were only three type X groups, security S3 will be redeemed at 100 ECU and
the others at 0 ECU
For example, if Group A & Group B & Group C were all type X, then certificates of class
S0, S1 and S2 will be redeemed at 0 ECU, whilst certificate of class S3 will be redeemed
at 100 ECU. Alternatively, if Group A & B were type X but Group C was type O, then
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certificates S0, S1 and S3 will be redeemed at 0 ECU, whilst certificate S2 will be redeemed
at 100 ECU.
Submitting your Decision
Before you will know the redemption value of your certificates, you will be presented with
the following question, which you must answer.
Qns: “How many type X groups are there in this round?” to which you must answer
with either (a) 0 Type X groups, (b) 1 Type X groups, (c) 2 Type X groups or (d) 3 Type
X groups
Please note that the question refers to the “total number of type X groups” and not the
type of your group. You will be awarded 200 ECU if you are correct and lose 200 ECU if
you are wrong.
End of Round Payoffs
After you have completed the decision stage, your payoff for the round are computed as:
Payoffs = (Money at the end of Trading Stage) + (Money from Certificate Redemption) +
(Payoffs from Decision) – (5,000 ECU loan)
Please feel free to clarify any questions or doubts that you might have with regards to
the instructions or the experimental design.
Control questions
Q1 If there is only one type-X group, for how much will each asset (S0, S1, S2, S3) be
redeemed?
Q2 If there is only two type-X group, for how much will each asset (S0, S1, S2, S3) be
redeemed?
Q3 What is the probability that your group is of type X?
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Appendix B: Screenshots
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Appendix C: Market prices
C.1 Session Level Data
The experimental data from the Market and Post-market stages of sessions 1 to 7 are pre-
sented in Figures C1–C7, respectively. The panels in each figure are arranged with rounds
(1–10, increasing from left to right) and assets (increasing from top to bottom) along the
columns and rows, respectively. For example, the top left panel of Figure C1 details the
transacted prices, unfilled bids and asks prices of asset 0 in round 1 of session 1. The
FRE and PIE prices are depicted in each panel with the solid and dashed horizontal lines,
respectively.
The header of each panel presents the round, followed by the asset type and the proportion
of submitted beliefs corresponding to the asset. For example, 8% subjects in round 1 of
session 1 submitted the belief that the true event is x(s) = 0.
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C.2 Further information about relative prices
In section 4.1.1 of the main paper, we provide a measure of market efficiency based on the
relative prices of the highest (labelled as asset A) and second highest (labelled as asset B)
assets at time window t. Based on the above, we derive ft and f t , which can be defined for
any   1. In the main paper we plot ft and f t for  = 1; 1:5; 2; 2:5; 3. On Figure C8, we plot
ft and f t for  = 1; 1:1; 1:2; 1:3; 1:4; 1:5. As with higher values of , ft and f t decrease as 
increase. ft and f t remain rather constant across the duration of the round when subjects
are inexperienced, but trend upwards for experienced subjects.
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Figure C8: ft and f t for  = 1; 1:1; 1:2; 1:3; 1:4; 1:5.
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Appendix D: Subject level data
D.1 Seemingly irrational purchases and bankruptcy
Purchases of assets above 100 ECU are “irrational” in the sense that the maximum redemp-
tion value of each asset is 100 ECU. It is, however, rational to purchase an asset at a high
price in order to manipulate other traders’ beliefs and sell more units of the asset at a gain,
or if the buyer believes she will be able to resale the asset at a higher price. Such seemingly
irrational purchases form 19% and 9% of all purchases for inexperienced and experienced
subjects, respectively. Subjects incurred bankruptcies in 75 (17%) and 39 (9%) instances
for inexperienced and experienced subjects, respectively.43 In this section, we elaborate on
these two observations and how they might be linked.
We assigned a unique ID number to each of the 84 subjects: 1–12 (session 1), 13–24
(session 2), 14–36 (session 3), 37–48 (session 4), 49–60 (session 5) 61–72 (session 6) and 73–
84 (session 8). Figure D1 presents the number of irrational purchases made by inexperienced
and experienced subjects. For inexperienced subjects, irrational purchases seem to be evenly
spread across all subjects. In contrast, irrational purchases for experienced subjects seem to
cluster around a handful of subjects, most notably subject 6, 11 and 37. As we will later
show, experienced subject 6 will be of special interest as he was observed to make more
than 70 irrational purchases.
Figure D2 presents the number of bankruptcies for inexperienced and experienced sub-
jects. Except for experienced subject 6, there seems to be a correlation between the frequency
of irrational purchases and bankruptcies (Spearman correlations are  = 0:63 and  = 0:35
for inexperienced and experienced subjects, respectively). This should be expected given
that our payoff structure implies that subjects who often purchase assets above 100 ECU or
a non-true asset above 50 ECU make a negative payoff in expectations.
It is somewhat peculiar that experienced subject 6 frequently made seemingly irrational
purchases, but never went bankrupt. To shed some light on this matter, we focus on the
purchasing behaviours of subjects. From Figure D1, we observe that experienced subject 6
had frequently purchased the true asset. Some of such also occurred above 100 ECU at the
range between 101–120 ECU. At the same time, the same subject also frequently sold the
non-true assets at prices above 0 ECU. As such, experienced subject 6 often compensated
the losses from seemingly irrational purchases with the gains from selling off the non-true
43 A subject is said to be bankrupt if his payoffs at the end of the round are negative.
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assets. Figure D4 details the average share of true asset held in the subjects’ inventory.
Here, we see that the true asset form around 80% of the experienced subject 6’s inventory.
For the above reasons, the subject avoided bankruptcy.
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Figure D1: Frequency of purchases at prices above 100 by subject ID.
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Figure D2: Frequency of bankruptcies by subject ID.
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Figure D3: Frequency of true asset owned by subject ID.
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Figure D4: Proportion of true asset purchases by subject ID.
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D.2 Non-Minority and minority subject differences
The following graphs provide details as to how the behaviours of the non-minority and minor-
ity subjects differ across the rounds. The graphs are based on data from the heterogeneous
information events, where minority traders exist.
Figure D5 presents the proportion of correct minority and non-minority subjects at each
round. With the exception of rounds 4 and 5, minority subjects are more frequently observed
to be correct.
Figure D6 presents the mean proportion (%) of true assets in the inventory of minority
and non-minority subjects at each round. Here, we observe that from round 7 onwards,
minority subjects clearly hold a greater proportion of the true asset in their inventory. The
differences from the earlier rounds are less obvious.
Figure D7 presents the mean number of convergent purchases by minority and non-
minority subjects at each round. Here, we see some evidence that mean convergent purchases
are more frequently higher for minority subjects.
Figure D8 presents the mean absolute deviation of purchase prices from FRE. Here,
we see that deviations are somewhat higher for non-minority relative to minority subjects,
though the differences seem to be decreasing with rounds.
Figure D9 details the mean market stage payoffs for minority and non-minority subjects.
There does not seem to be any obvious pattern as to differences in payoffs between both
groups of subjects.
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Figure D5: Proportion of correct minority and non-minority subjects.
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Figure D6: Proportion of True assets in inventory of minority and non-minority subjects.
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Figure D7: Number of convergent purchases per minority and non-minority subjects.
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Figure D8: Mean absolute deviation of purchase price from FRE for minority and non-
minority subjects.
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Figure D9: Market stage payoff for minority and non-minority subjects.
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